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Abstract—The problem of secret-key based authentication
under privacy and storage constraints on the source sequence
is considered. The identifier measurement channels during au-
thentication are assumed to be controllable via a cost-constrained
action sequence. Single-letter inner and outer bounds for the key-
leakage-storage-cost regions are derived for a generalization of a
classic two-terminal key agreement model with an eavesdropper
that observes a sequence that is correlated with the sequences
observed by the legitimate terminals. The additions to the model
are that the encoder observes a noisy version of a remote source,
and the noisy output and the remote source output together
with an action sequence are given as inputs to the measurement
channel at the decoder. Thus, correlation is introduced between
the noise components on the encoder and decoder measurements.
The model with a secret key generated by an encoder is extended
to the randomized models, where a secret-key is embedded
to the encoder. The results are relevant for several user and
device authentication scenarios including physical and biometric
identifiers with multiple measurements that provide diversity and
multiplexing gains. To illustrate the behavior of the rate region,
achievable (secret-key rate, storage-rate, cost) tuples are given
for binary identifiers and measurement channels that can be
represented as a mixture of binary symmetric subchannels. The
gains from using an action sequence such as a large secret-key
rate at a significantly small hardware cost, are illustrated to
motivate the use of low-complexity transform-coding algorithms
with cost-constrained actions.
I. INTRODUCTION
A traditional method for security is to store secret keys
used for, e.g., device authentication in a hardware-protected
non-volatile memory (NVM). Biometric identifiers such as
fingerprints and physical identifiers such as random and unique
oscillation frequencies of ring oscillators (ROs) are secure
and cheap alternatives to key storage in an NVM. Physical
unclonable functions (PUFs) are physical identifiers that are
challenge response mappings such that it is easy to evaluate
the response to a given challenge and hard to guess the
response to a randomly chosen challenge [1]. PUFs can be
used as a source of local randomness for the wiretap channel
(WTC) [2], where the optimal coding scheme requires random
sequences at the WTC encoder. Other applications of PUFs are
Internet-of-Things (IoT) device security, intellectual property
(IP) protection in a field programmable gate array (FPGA),
and non-repudiation [3, Chapter 1].
We extend the source model for key agreement from [4],
[5] to consider multiple improvements to private authentication
with PUFs and biometrics. The original model considers that
an encoder observes a source output to generate a key and
to send public information, called helper data, to a decoder.
Key agreement at the decoder is successful when the decoder
observes a noisy source output and enough amount of helper
data to reconstruct the same key. The secrecy measure used
is the amount of information the helper data leaks about the
secret key, i.e., secrecy leakage, which should be negligible.
Similarly, [6], [7] argue that the information leaked about the
source output should be also small to keep privacy leakage as
small as possible, which cannot be made negligible for general
cases. The amount of public storage should also be kept small
to limit the hardware cost [8], [9].
Biometric and physical identifier outputs are noisy. Suppose
we have multiple measurements of an identifier source at the
encoder, which assumes that the source is hidden or remote
[10]. The source, noisy identifier, and measurement symbol
strings are proposed in [11] to be related by a broadcast
channel (BC) with one input and two outputs to capture the
effects of correlated noise in the measurements. For instance,
the surrounding hardware logic is the main reason for the
noise components on encoder and decoder measurements of
the same RO to be correlated [12]. Motivated by the use of dif-
ferent identifier-measurement forms, e.g., the use of multiple
measurements or variations in the quality of the measurement
process [13], we extend a private authentication model from
[14]. In this model, identifier measurements are represented by
a cost-constrained action-dependent side information acquisi-
tion where an action sequence determines the measurement
channel at the decoder. A high cost for an action represents,
e.g., the use of a high quality measurement device that results
in a small error probability. We combine the BC measurement
model with the action-dependent private authentication model
to consider the correlated noise on encoder and decoder
measurements such that the decoder measurement channel can
be adapted to the variations in the ambient temperature, supply
voltage, and surrounding logic.
Suppose the encoder generates a key from a noisy identifier
output. We call this model the generated-secret (GS) model.
Similarly, for the chosen-secret (CS) model, a chosen key
and noisy identifier measurements are combined to generate
the helper data. We consider also the CS model to address
the cases where the encoder, e.g., a hardware manufacturer
(for PUFs) or a trusted entity (for biometrics), pre-determines
the secret key for practical reasons. Key agreement with
correlated side information at the eavesdropper (EVE) is
considered in, e.g., [15]–[19]. This assumption is realistic for
key agreement with biometric identifiers since an eavesdropper
can obtain side information from, e.g., any object touched
by an individual. PUF outputs are permanently changed by
invasive attacks [20], so non-invasive attacks to the devices
that embody the PUF should be considered to make this model
realistic for physical identifiers. We allow side information
at the eavesdropper to consider both biometric and physical
identifier models. Furthermore, we study independent and
identically distributed (i.i.d.) source outputs and memoryless
measurement channels. These models are realistic if one uses
transform-coding algorithms from [21], [22] to extract almost
i.i.d. sequences from PUFs or biometric identifiers.
We derive achievable key-leakage-storage-cost regions for
a decoder measurement channel with three inputs and two
outputs for a strong secrecy metric. The model of the separate
encoder and decoder measurements in [14] corresponds to a
physically-degraded measurement channel for a weak secrecy
metric. To provide strong secrecy, there is a “private” key
assumption, e.g., in [6], [7], [23], where they consider that
the key is available to the encoder and decoder and is hidden
from an eavesdropper. This assumption is unrealistic because
if a private-key protection against attackers is feasible, then
there is no need for key agreement with identifiers. We do not
make such unrealistic assumptions to provide strong secrecy
and we use the output statistics of random binning (OSRB)
method from [24], which requires only local randomness. Our
rate regions recover previous rate regions in the literature for
hidden and visible sources. We establish outer bounds for
conditionally less-noisy (CLN) channels defined in [25]. The
inner bounds and outer bounds for the GS models are extended
to the randomized models, i.e., CS models.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we
describe our models and the problem. We give achievable
key-leakage-storage-cost regions for the GS and CS models
in Section III. We define CLN channels and show outer
bounds for the key-leakage-storage-cost regions in Section IV
if two CLN conditions are satisfied. We give an example
in Section V to illustrate the gains from having a larger
hardware area available for public storage in combination with
a cost-constrained action sequence for a practical PUF design.
Achievability proofs for the inner bounds and outer bounds for
CLN channels are given in Sections VI and VII, respectively.
Section VIII concludes the paper.
II. PROBLEM DEFINITIONS
Consider the GS model in Fig. 1(a), where a key is
generated from a hidden source. The source X , measurement
X˜ ,Y,Z , and action A alphabets are finite sets. The encoder
observes uncontrollable noisy measurements X˜n of the i.i.d.
PX
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Fig. 1. A hidden identifier source: (a) represents the GS model with the
encoder f1(·) and (b) represents the CS model with the encoder f2(·, ·).
hidden source outputs Xn through a memoryless channel
P
X˜|X . The encoder computes a secret key S and public helper
data W as (W,S) = f1(X˜
n). During authentication, the
action encoder observes the helper data W and computes an
action sequence An as An = fa(W ). Then, the decoder, given
(Xn, X˜n, An), observes cost-constrained controllable source
measurements Y n through a memoryless channel P
Y Z|XX˜A
together with the helper dataW and estimates the secret key as
Sˆ = g(W,Y n). The eavesdropper observes Zn as the output
of the same memoryless channel in addition to the public
helper dataW . Similarly, Fig. 1(b) shows the CS model, where
a secret key S that is independent of (Xn, X˜n, Y n, Zn) is
embedded into the helper data as W = f2(X˜
n, S). The action
encoder and the decoder for the CS model are applied in a
similar way to the GS model.
Definition 1. A key-leakage-storage-cost tuple
(Rs, Rℓ, Rw, C) is achievable for the GS or CS model
if, given δ>0, there is some n≥1, an encoder, and a decoder
such that Rs=
log |S|
n
and
Pr[Sˆ 6= S] ≤ δ (reliability) (1)
I(S;W,Zn) ≤ δ (strong secrecy) (2)
1
n
H(S) ≥ Rs − δ (uniformity) (3)
1
n
I(Xn;W,Zn) ≤ Rℓ + δ (privacy) (4)
1
n
log
∣∣W∣∣ ≤ Rw + δ (storage) (5)
E[Γ(An)] ≤ C + δ (action cost) (6)
where we have Γ(An) = 1
n
∑n
i=1 Γ(Ai). The key-leakage-
storage-cost regions Rgs and Rcs for the GS and CS models,
respectively, are the closures of the sets of all achievable tuples
for the corresponding models. ♦
III. INNER BOUNDS
We are interested in characterizing the optimal trade-off
among the secret-key rate, privacy-leakage rate, storage rate,
and action cost with strong secrecy for correlated noise on
the encoder and decoder measurements. We give achievable
rate regions for the GS and CS models in Theorem 1. See
Section VI for proofs. Define
Rℓ,1 = I(V,X ;Z|A) + I(X ;A, V, Y )− I(V,X ;Y |A)
Rℓ,2 = I(V,X ;Z|A,U) + I(X ;A, V, Y )
− I(V,X ;Y |A,U)
Rℓ,3 = I(X ;A,U, Z).
Theorem 1 (Inner Bounds for GS and CS Models). An inner
bound for the rate region Rgs for the GS model is the set of
all tuples (Rs, Rℓ, Rw, C) satisfying
0 ≤ Rs≤I(V ;Y |A,U)− I(V ;Z|A,U) (7)
Rℓ≥ max
{
Rℓ,1, Rℓ,2, Rℓ,3
}
(8)
Rw ≥ I(X˜;A) + I(V ; X˜|A, Y ) (9)
for some PXPX˜|XPA|X˜PY Z|XX˜APV |X˜APU|V such that
E[Γ(A)]≤C.
Similarly, an inner bound for the rate region Rcs for the
CS model is the set of all tuples (Rs, Rℓ, Rw, C) satisfying
(7), (8), and
Rw ≥ I(X˜;A, V )− I(U ;Y |A)− I(V ;Z|A,U) (10)
for some PXPX˜|XPA|X˜PY Z|XX˜APV |X˜APU|V such that
E[Γ(A)]≤C.
Proof Sketch: The proof for the GS model uses the
OSRB method that assigns random bin indices to sequences
an, un, and vn to obtain strong secrecy. Using the OSRB
method consecutively, nine cases are analyzed, resulting in
six different terms whose maximum is used in (8). The proof
for the CS model uses the key generated by using the proof
for the GS model and applies a one-time padding step to the
embedded secret key and the key generated by the GS model.
The main effect is the increase in the storage rate as compared
to the GS model by the amount equal to the bound in (7).
In [14], separate measurements P
XX˜AY Z
=
P
A|X˜PX˜|XPXPY Z|XA and a weak secrecy constraint
such that (2) is replaced with 1
n
I(S;W,Zn) ≤ δ, are
considered. The model in Fig. 1 extends [14] by considering
correlation in the noise components on the encoder and
decoder measurements with strong secrecy. Such a correlation
is considered in [11] for a model without cost-constrained
action-dependent measurements at the decoder and without
correlated side information Zn at the eavesdropper. Broadcast
channel (BC) measurements are considered in [11] to model
the correlation in the noise components. Due to the causal
dependence of An on X˜n, one cannot model X˜n as an output
of the action-dependent measurement channel, so Fig. 1
considers the encoder measurement X˜n as an input to the
measurement channel P
Y Z|XX˜A. This model is the case, e.g.,
if the decoder and encoder measurements are made within
a coherence time, in analogy to wireless communication
systems, so the encoder measurements X˜n affect RO outputs
at the decoder due to remanining temperature and current
effects on digital circuits. A similar model is considered in
[13, Fig. 9] for a source coding with side information problem
without secrecy, privacy, and secret-key rate constraints.
Remark 1. The bounds in Theorem 1 recover the key-
leakage-storage-cost regions given in [14, Theorems 3 and 4]
for the separate-measurement model such that P
XX˜AY Z
=
P
A|X˜PX˜|XPXPY Z|XA since we have
Rℓ,2
(a)
= I(X ;Z|A,U)+I(X ;A, V, Y )−I(X ;Y |A,U) (11)
where (a) follows for the separate-measurement model be-
cause (U, V ) − (A,X) − (Z, Y ) form a Markov chain for
this model. Similarly, the key-leakage-storage rate regions
given in [10] for measurement channels such that P
XX˜Y
=
PXPX˜|XPY |X are recovered by the bounds in Theorem 1 if
we choose (Z,U,A) as constants. Theorem 1 bounds recover
the key-leakage and key-leakage-storage regions for visible
source models, where encoder measurements are noiseless
such that X˜n = Xn, given in [6], [7], [14, Theorems 1 and 2].
IV. OUTER BOUNDS
We give outer bounds for CLN channels, defined in Defini-
tion 2, for the model depicted in Fig. 1.
Definition 2 ([25]). X is conditionally less-noisy (CLN) than
Z given (A, Y ) if
I(L;X |A, Y ) ≥ I(L;Z|A, Y ) (12)
holds for any random variable L such that L − (A, X˜, Y ) −
(X,Z) form a Markov chain and we denote this relation as
(X ≥ Z|A, Y ).
The set of CLN channels is shown in [25] to be larger than
the set of physically degraded channels. We give outer bounds
for the rate regions Rgs and Rcs in Theorem 2 when two CLN
conditions are satisfied. See Section VII for proofs.
Theorem 2 (Outer Bounds for GS and CS Models). An outer
bound for the rate region Rgs for all CLN channels such that
(X ≥ Z|A, Y ) and (Z ≥ Y |A,X) is the set of all tuples
(Rs, Rℓ, Rw, C) satisfying
0 ≤ Rs≤I(V ;Y |A,U)− I(V ;Z|A,U) (13)
Rℓ≥ I(X ;A, V, Y )−I(X ;Y |A)+I(X ;Z|A)
+ I(U ;Y |A)− I(U ;Z|A) (14)
Rw ≥ I(X˜ ;A) + I(V ; X˜|A, Y ) (15)
such that U−V −(A, X˜)−(A, X˜,X)−(Y, Z) form a Markov
chain and E[Γ(A)]≤C.
Similarly, an outer bound for the rate region Rcs for all
CLN channels such that (X ≥ Z|A, Y ) and (Z ≥ Y |A,X) is
the set of all tuples (Rs, Rℓ, Rw, C) satisfying (13), (14), and
Rw ≥ I(X˜;A, V )− I(U ;Y |A) − I(V ;Z|A,U) (16)
such that U−V −(A, X˜)−(A, X˜,X)−(Y, Z) form a Markov
chain and E[Γ(A)]≤C. It suffices to limit the cardinalities to
|U|≤|A||X˜ |+3 and |V|≤(|A||X˜ |+3)(|A||X˜ |+2).
Proof Sketch: The proof for the privacy-leakage rate Rℓ
bound uses an inequality that we prove for the CLN channel
(X ≥ Z|A, Y ), which might be useful also for other problems.
We also assume another CLN condition (Z ≥ Y |A,X)
and prove the existence of a single-letter representation of a
subtraction of conditional entropies to find a lower bound for
the subtraction term by applying the properties of the second
CLN condition. The proofs for the secret-key rate, storage
rate, and action cost follow by using standard properties of
the Shannon entropy.
Remark 2. The bounds in Theorem 2 recover the key-
leakage-storage-cost regions given for the more restrictive case
considered in [14] with the Markov chain X˜−(A,X)−(Y, Z)
since we have in (14) for the more restrictive case that
Rℓ≥ I(X ;A, V, Y )−I(X ;Y |A)+I(X ;Z|A)
+ I(U ;Y |A)− I(U ;Z|A)
(a)
= I(X ;A, V, Y )− I(X ;Y |A,U) + I(X ;Z|A,U) (17)
where (a) follows from the Markov chain U−(A,X)−(Y, Z),
which is valid only for the more restrictive case. It is straight-
forward to show that the bounds in Theorem 2 recover the
outer bounds given in [6], [7], [9], [11].
V. EXAMPLE
We illustrate the effects of the storage rate on the achievable
secret-key rate and expected action cost. An achievable key-
leakage-storage-cost tradeoff with additional assumptions for
the auxiliary random variables and with realistic measurement
channel parameters suffices to motivate the use of an action
in practical biometric secrecy systems and PUFs.
Suppose the hidden identifier outputs Xn are uniformly dis-
tributed bit sequences, the eavesdropper side information Zn
is a physically-degraded version of the decoder measurements
Y n, i.e., (A, X˜,X)−Y −Z form a Markov chain, and we have
binary symmetric channels (BSCs) with crossover probabilities
p, denoted as BSC(p), such that
P
X˜|X(·|·) ∼ BSC(penc) (18)
PZ|Y (·|·) ∼ BSC(peve) (19)
P
Y |XX˜A(·|·, x˜, a) ∼ BSC(qx˜a) for all x˜, a ∈ {0, 1}. (20)
Consider physical identifiers like start-up values of static
random access memories (SRAM) or RO outputs. Symmetric
source outputs and BSCs are realistic source and channel
models for such identifiers [21], [26]. We can therefore use
the channel parameters obtained in the literature for real ROs
and SRAMs.
Decoder measurements with smaller crossover probability
can be obtained by applying additional post-processing steps,
which increases the hardware cost [27]. Suppose that the action
A = a chooses BSCs such that qx˜0 < qx˜1 for all x˜ ∈ {0, 1},
i.e., A = 0 chooses more reliable measurement channels with
higher cost. Similarly, assume q0a < q1a for all a ∈ {0, 1},
i.e., X˜ = 0 chooses more reliable measurement channels
with higher cost. This assumption is realistic if the ambient
temperature increases during encoder measurements since the
oscillation frequency of an RO decreases with increasing
temperature [28], which results in a bias towards the bit 0
after quantization. In such a case, the decoder measurement
channels should be chosen to be more reliable to compensate
for the performance loss due to the temperature increase.
Moreover, the action cost should be higher for the cases with
higher hardware cost. We thus choose the costs of actions as
Γ(0) =
q01 + q11
q01 + q11 + q10 + q00
, Γ(1) = 1− Γ(0) (21)
where q00, q01, q10, q11 are as defined in (20). We use real-
istic crossover probabilities for RO PUFs combined with the
transform-coding algorithm given in [3] and satisfy the as-
sumptions given above by choosing penc = 0.05, q00 = 0.010,
q10 = 0.030, q01 = 0.050, q11 = 0.060, and peve ≈ 0.102
such that peve ∗ q11 = 0.150, where ∗-operator is defined as
p ∗ q = (1 − 2q)p + q. The crossover probability of 0.150
corresponds to the case that the eavesdropper observes noisy
PUF ouputs but cannot control the environmental variations
as a passive attacker [28]. Furthermore, these values result in
Γ(0) ≈ 0.733 units and Γ(1) ≈ 0.267 units by (21).
Let the auxiliary random variable U be constant, so from
Theorem 1 we have an inner bound for the GS model that is
the set of all tuples (Rs, Rℓ, Rw, C) satisfying
0 ≤ Rs ≤ I(V ;Y |A)− I(V ;Z|A) (22)
Rℓ ≥ max
{
I(V,X ;Z|A) + I(X ;A, V, Y )− I(V,X ;Y |A),
I(X ;A,Z)
}
(23)
Rw ≥ I(X˜;A) + I(V ; X˜|A, Y ) (24)
for some PXPX˜|XPA|X˜PY Z|XX˜APV |X˜A such that E[Γ(A)]≤
C. Let P
A|X˜ be a binary channel and PV |AX˜(·|a, ·) be a
BSC(pa) for a = 0, 1. We evaluate an achievable key-
leakage-storage-cost region for all possible P
A|X˜ and plot the
(cost vs. secret-key rate) projection of the boundary tuples
(Rs, Rℓ, Rw, C) for different storage rates Rw bits/source-
symbol in Fig. 2. Any secret-key rate less than the secret-
key rates on the boundary and any cost greater than the
cost on the boundary are also achievable. The minimum and
maximum expected costs depicted in Fig. 2 are Γ(1) and
Γ(0), respectively, since these are costs of two possible actions
A = a. The secret-key rate Rs in Fig. 2 does not decrease
with increasing cost C because for a higher cost better set of
channels, i.e., channels with smaller crosssover probabilities,
can be used for decoder measurements.
Fig. 2 shows that, for a given cost C = c, the secret-key
rate Rs increases for increasing storage rate Rw. Moreover,
the maximum secret-key rates, denoted by R∗s , for different
storage rates Rw are different and they are obtained at different
minimum cost values, denoted by C∗. For instance, for Rw=
0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
Cost C
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Rw = 0.001
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Rw = 0.250
Fig. 2. Cost vs. secret-key rate projection of the boundary tuples
(Rs, Rℓ, Rw, C) for the GS model with storage rates Rw of 0.001, 0.050,
and 0.250 bits/source-symbol.
0.001 bits/source-symbol we have (C∗=0.5821, R∗s =0.3021
bits/source-symbol); whereas for Rw = 0.250 bits/source-
symbol we obtain (C∗ = 0.5028, R∗s = 0.3058 bits/source-
symbol). This illustrates that having a larger public storage
available increases the maximum secret-key rate, e.g., for
the given example by approximately 1.22%, and significantly
decreases the required expected action cost to achieve the
maximum secret-key rate, e.g., for this example by approx-
imately 13.62%. Thus, a low-complexity PUF design with
small hardware area as in [21], should be used to allocate
a large hardware area for helper data storage, which provides
significant gains in the achieved rate tuples in combination
with an action sequence.
VI. PROOF OF THEOREM 1
We provide a proof that follows from the output statistics
of random binning (OSRB) method [24] by applying the steps
in [29, Section 1.6].
A. Proof for the GS Model
Proof Sketch: Fix P
A|X˜ , PV |X˜A, and
PU|V such that E[Γ(A)] ≤ C + ǫ and let
(Un, V n, An, X˜n, Xn, Y n, Zn) be i.i.d. according to
P
UV AX˜XY Z
= PU|V PV |X˜APA|X˜PX˜|XPXPY Z|XX˜A.
Suppose H(V |U,A,Z)−H(V |U,A, Y ) > 0.
Assign two random bin indices (Fa,Wa) to each a
n. Assume
Fa ∈ [1 : 2
nR˜a ] and Wa ∈ [1 : 2
nRa ]. Similarly, assign two
indices (Fu,Wu) to each u
n, where Fu ∈ [1 : 2
nR˜u ] and Wu ∈
[1 : 2nRu ]. Furthermore, assign three indices (Fv,Wv, S) to
each vn, where Fv ∈ [1 : 2
nR˜v ], Wv ∈ [1 : 2
nRv ], and S ∈
[1 : 2nRs ]. The helper data are W = (Wa,Wu,Wv), the public
indices are F = (Fa, Fu, Fv), and the secret key is S.
Reliable estimation of An from (Fa,Wa) is possible if [24,
Lemma 1]
R˜a +Ra > H(A). (25)
Using a Slepian-Wolf (SW) [30] decoder, one can reliably
estimate Un from (Fu,Wu, A
n, Y n) if [24, Lemma 1]
R˜u +Ru > H(U |Y,A). (26)
Similarly, one can reliably estimate V n from
(Fv,Wv, A
n, Y n, Un) by using a SW decoder if [24,
Lemma 1]
R˜v +Rv > H(V |U, Y,A). (27)
Thus, the reliability constraint in (1) is satisfied if (25)-(27)
are satisfied.
The strong secrecy (2) and key uniformity (3) constraints
are satisfied if [24, Theorem 1]
Rs + R˜v +Rv < H(V |U,A,Z) (28)
since (28) ensures that the three random indices (S, Fv,Wv)
are almost independent of (Un, An, Zn) and are almost mu-
tually independent and uniformly distributed.
The public index Fa is almost independent of X˜
n, so it
is almost independent of (X˜n, Xn, Y n, Zn), if we have [24,
Theorem 1]
R˜a < H(A|X˜). (29)
Similarly, the public index Fu is almost independent
of (An, X˜n), so it is almost independent of
(An, X˜n, Xn, Y n, Zn), if we have [24, Theorem 1]
R˜u < H(U |A, X˜). (30)
Furthermore, the public index Fv is almost indepen-
dent of (Un, An, X˜n), so it is almost independent of
(Un, An, X˜n, Xn, Y n, Zn), if we have [24, Theorem 1]
R˜v < H(V |U,A, X˜). (31)
Thus, the public indices F can be fixed by generating them
uniformly at random. The encoder can generate (An, Un, V n)
according to P
AnUnV n|X˜nFaFuFv
obtained from the binning
scheme above to compute the bins Wa from A
n, Wu from
Un, and (Wv, S) from V
n. This procedure induces a joint
probability distribution that is almost equal to P
UV AX˜XY Z
fixed above [29, Section 1.6].
To satisfy the constraints (25)-(31), we fix the rates to
R˜a = H(A|X˜)− ǫ (32)
Ra = I(A; X˜) + 2ǫ (33)
R˜u = H(U |A, X˜)− ǫ (34)
Ru = I(U ; X˜|A)− I(U ;Y |A) + 2ǫ (35)
R˜v = H(V |U,A, X˜)− ǫ (36)
Rv = I(V ; X˜|A,U)− I(V ;Y |A,U) + 2ǫ (37)
Rs = I(V ;Y |A,U)− I(V ;Z|A,U)− 2ǫ (38)
for some ǫ > 0 such that ǫ→ 0 when n→∞. This results in
a storage (helper-data) rate Rw of
Rw = Ra +Ru +Rv
= I(A; X˜) + I(U, V ; X˜|A)− I(U, V ;Y |A) + 6ǫ
(a)
= I(A; X˜) + I(V ; X˜|A)− I(V ;Y |A) + 6ǫ
(b)
= I(A; X˜) + I(V ; X˜|A, Y ) + 6ǫ (39)
where (a) follows because U−(V,A)−(X˜, Y ) form a Markov
chain and (b) follows since V − (A, X˜) − Y form a Markov
chain. Furthermore, since each action sequence an is in the
typical set with high probability, by the typical average lemma
[31, pp. 26], the expected cost constraint in (6) is satisfied.
Furthermore, using the selection lemma [32, Lemma 2.2],
there exists a binning that achieves all rate tuples given in
(32)-(39).
Consider the privacy leakage for a binning that satisfies
(32)-(39). Since F is public, we can bound the privacy leakage
as follows.
I(Xn;W,Zn, F )
(a)
≤ I(Xn;W,Zn|F ) + 3ǫn
(b)
≤H(Xn|F )−H(Xn,W,Zn|F )+H(W |F )+H(Zn|An, Un)
+I(An, Un;Zn|Wa, Fa,Wu, Fu)+4ǫn
(c)
≤−H(Zn|Xn, F )−H(W,An|Xn, Zn, F ) +H(W |F )
+H(An|W,Xn, Zn, F ) +H(Zn|An, Un)+4ǫn+nǫ
′
n
+ I(Un;Zn|An,Wu, Fu)
(d)
≤ −H(An|Xn, Fa)+I(Fu, Fv;A
n|Xn, Fa)−H(Z
n|An, Xn)
+I(Zn;Fu, Fv|A
n, Xn)−H(W |An, Xn, Zn, F )+2nǫ′n
+4ǫn+H(W |F )+H(Z
n|An, Un)+I(Un;Zn|An,Wu, Fu)
(e)
≤−H(An|Xn)+H(Fa|X
n)−H(Zn|An, Xn)+2nǫ′n+8ǫn
−H(Wu, V
n|An, Xn, Zn, F ) +H(V n|W,An, Xn, Zn, F )
+H(W |F )+H(Zn|An, Un)+I(Un;Zn|An,Wu, Fu)
(f)
≤ −H(An|Xn)+nH(A|X˜)−H(Zn|An, Xn)+2nǫ′n+8ǫn
−H(V n|An, X˜n, F )−I(V n; X˜n|An, Xn, Zn, F )
+H(V n|W,An, Xn, Zn, F )+H(W |F )+H(Zn|An, Un)
+nI(U ;Y |A) + 5ǫn−H(U
n|Zn, An,Wu, Fu)
(g)
≤ −H(An|Xn)+nH(A|X˜)−H(Zn|An, Xn, Un)
−I(Un;Zn|An, Xn)+2nǫ′n+15ǫn
−H(X˜n|An, Xn, Zn)+H(X˜n|An, Xn, Zn, V n)
+H(V n|W,An, Xn, Zn, F )+H(Wa)+H(Wu)+H(Wv)
+H(Zn|An, Un)+nI(U ;Y |A)−H(Un|Zn, An,Wu, Fu)
(h)
≤ n
(
−H(A|X)+H(A|X˜)+I(X ;Z|A,U)−I(U ;Z|A,X)
)
− nI(X˜;V |A,X,Z)+2nǫ′n+15ǫn
+ n
(
I(X˜ ;A, V )− I(U ;Y |A)− I(V ;Y |A,U) + 6ǫ
)
+ nI(U ;Y |A)−H(Un|Zn, An,Wu, Fu)
+H(V n|W,An, Xn, Zn, F )
(i)
≤ n
(
I(X ;Z|A,U)−I(U ;Z|A,X)
)
+2nǫ′n+15ǫn + 6nǫ
+ n
(
−H(V,A|X)+I(V ;Z|A,X)+H(V,A|X˜)
)
+ n
(
I(X˜ ;A, V )− I(V ;Y |A,U)
)
−H(Un|Zn, An,Wu, Fu) +H(V
n|W,An, Xn, Zn, F )
(j)
= n
(
I(X ;Z|A,U) + I(X ;A, V )− I(V ;Y |A,U)
)
+2nǫ′n+15ǫn + 6nǫ+ nI(V ;Z|A,X,U)
−H(Un|Zn, An,Wu, Fu)+H(V
n|W,An, Xn, Zn, F )
(k)
= n
(
I(X ;Z|A,U) + I(X ;A, V, Y )− I(X,V ;Y |A,U)
)
+2nǫ′n+15ǫn + 6nǫ+ nI(V ;Z|A,X,U)
−H(Un|Zn, An,Wu, Fu)+H(V
n|W,An, Xn, Zn, F )
= n
(
I(X ;Z|A,U) + I(X ;A, V, Y )− I(X ;Y |A,U)
)
+2nǫ′n+15ǫn + 6nǫ+ nI(V ;Z|A,X,U)
−H(Un|Zn, An,Wu, Fu)− nI(V ;Y |A,X,U)
+H(V n|W,An, Xn, Zn, F ) (40)
where
(a) follows from [24, Theorem 1] such that we have that F
is almost independent of (X˜n, Xn) due to the Markov chain
Xn − X˜n − F . We have
I(Xn;F ) = I(Xn;Fa) + I(X
n;Fu|Fa) + I(X
n;Fv|Fa, Fu)
(a.1)
≤ 3ǫn (41)
where (a.1) follows by (32), (34), and (36), and from the facts
that An determines Fa and U
n determines Fu, for some ǫn > 0
with ǫn → 0 when n→∞;
(b) follows because (Fv,Wv) are almost independent of
(Un, An, Zn) by (28), An determines (Wa, Fa), and U
n
determines (Wu, Fu);
(c) follows since An determines (Fa,Wa), and from (25) and
[24, Lemma 1] we have H(An|Wa, Fa) ≤ nǫ
′
n for some
ǫ′n → 0 when n→∞;
(d) follows because by (25) such thatH(An|W,Xn, Zn, F ) ≤
nǫ′n for some ǫ
′
n → 0 when n→∞ and A
n determines Fa;
(e) follows by (30) and (31), and because An determines Wa,
V n determines Wv, and we obtain
I(Fu, Fv;A
n|Xn, Fa)
= I(Fu;A
n|Xn, Fa) + I(Fv;A
n|Xn, Fa, Fu) ≤ 2ǫn
and
I(Zn;Fu, Fv|A
n, Xn)
= I(Zn;Fu|A
n, Xn) + I(Zn;Fv|A
n, Xn, Fu) ≤ 2ǫn
since Fu is almost independent of (A
n, Xn, Zn), Un deter-
mines Fu, and Fv is almost independent of (U
n, An, Xn, Zn);
(f) follows by (32), from the Markov chain V n −
(An, X˜n, F )− (Xn, Zn), and from the following inequality
H(Un|An,Wu, Fu)
(f.1)
= H(Un|An)−H(Wu, Fu|A
n)
(f.2)
≤ H(Un|An)− (H(Wu|A
n) +H(Fu|A
n)− ǫn)
(f.3)
≤ H(Un|An)− (H(Wu)− ǫn)− (H(Fu)− ǫn) + ǫn
(f.4)
≤ H(Un|An)− (nRu − ǫn)− (nR˜u − ǫn) + 3ǫn
(f.5)
≤ nI(U ;Y |A) + 5ǫn (42)
where (f.1) follows because Un determines (Wu, Fu), (f.2)
follows from Ru + R˜u < H(U |A) for some ǫn > 0 such
that ǫn → 0 when n → ∞, (f.3) follows because Wu is
almost independent of An due to Ru < H(U |A) when n→∞
and Fu is almost independent of A
n due to R˜u < H(U |A)
when n → ∞ for some ǫn > 0 such that ǫn → 0 when
n→∞, (f.4) follows because (Wu, Fu) are almost uniformly
distributed due to Ru+R˜u < H(U), and (f.5) follows by (34)
and (35);
(g) follows since An determines Fa and by (30) and (31), and
we obtain
I(Fu, Fv; X˜
n|An, Xn, Zn)
=I(Fu; X˜
n|An, Xn, Zn)+I(Fv; X˜
n|An, Xn, Zn, Fu) ≤ 2ǫn
since Fu is almost independent of (A
n, Xn, Zn, X˜n),
Un determines Fu, and Fv is almost independent of
(Un, An, Xn, Zn, X˜n);
(h) follows by (33), (35), and (37), and from the Markov
chains A− X˜ −X and U − (V,A)− X˜ ;
(i) follows from the Markov chain V − (A, X˜)− (X,Z);
(j) follows from the Markov chain Z − (A,X, V )− U ;
(k) follows from the Markov chain U − (V,A) − (Y,X).
Consider multi-letter terms in (40), i.e.,
−H(Un|Zn, An,Wu, Fu) + H(V
n|W,An, Xn, Zn, F ).
There are nine cases we have to analyze for this sum.
Case 1: Suppose we have
Ru + R˜u < H(U |Z,A,X) (43)
Rv + R˜v ≥ H(V |Z,A,X). (44)
Then, Wu, Fu, and (Z
n, An, Xn) are almost mutually in-
dependent, and Wu and Fu are almost uniformly distributed
by [24, Theorem 1]. Furthermore, we can recover V n from
(Fv,Wv, Z
n, An, Xn) by using a SW decoder [24, Lemma
1]. We obtain
−H(Un|Zn, An,Wu, Fu)+H(V
n|W,An, Xn, Zn, F )
(a)
≤ −H(Un|Zn, An) +H(Wu, Fu|Z
n, An)
+H(V n|Wv, A
n, Xn, Zn, Fv)
(b)
≤ −H(Un|Zn, An) +H(Wu) +H(Fu) + nǫ
′
n
(c)
≤ n(−H(U |Z,A) +H(U |Y,A) + ǫ+ ǫ′n) (45)
where (a) follows because Un determines (Fu,Wu), (b) fol-
lows by (44) such that H(V n|Fv,Wv, Z
n, An, Xn) ≤ nǫ′n for
some ǫ′n > 0 such that ǫ
′
n → 0 when n→∞, and (c) follows
by (34) and (35).
Combining (40) and (45), we obtain for Case 1
I(Xn;W,Zn, F )
(a)
≤ n
(
I(X ;Z|A,U) + I(X ;A, V, Y )− I(X ;Y |A,U)
)
+ n
(
I(V ;Z|A,X,U)−I(V ;Y |A,X,U)
)
+ n(I(U ;Z|A)− I(U ;Y |A) + ǫ′′)
(b)
= n
(
I(V,X ;Z|A) + I(X ;A, V, Y )− I(V,X ;Y |A)
)
+ nǫ′′ (46)
where (a) follows for some ǫ′′ > 0 such that ǫ′′ → 0 when
n → ∞ and (b) follows from the Markov chain U − V −
(A,X,Z, Y ).
Case 2: Suppose we have
Ru + R˜u < H(U |Z,A,X) (47)
Rv + R˜v < H(V |Z,A,X) (48)
Rv + R˜v ≥ H(V |U,Z,A,X). (49)
Then,Wu, Fu, and (Z
n, An, Xn) are almost mutually indepen-
dent, and Wu and Fu are almost uniformly distributed by [24,
Theorem 1]. Similarly, Wv, Fv, and (Z
n, An, Xn) are almost
mutually independent [24, Theorem 1], but we can recover V n
from (Un, Zn, An, Xn) [24, Lemma 1]. Moreover,Wv and Fv
are almost uniformly distributed [24, Theorem 1]. We have
−H(Un|Zn, An,Wu, Fu)+H(V
n|W,An, Xn, Zn, F )
(a)
≤ −nH(U |Z,A) +H(Wu, Fu|Z
n, An) + nH(V |A,X,Z)
−H(Wu, Fu|A
n, Xn, Zn)
−H(Wv, Fv|A
n, Xn, Zn,Wu, Fu) + nH(U |A,X,Z, V )
(b)
≤ −nH(U |Z,A)+H(Wu) +H(Fu)+nH(U, V |A,X,Z)
− (H(Wu|A
n, Xn, Zn) +H(Fu|A
n, Xn, Zn)− ǫn)
−H(Fv|A
n, Xn, Zn,Wu, Fu)
−H(Wv|A
n, Xn, Zn,Wu, Fu, Fv)
(c)
≤ −nH(U |Z,A)+H(Wu) +H(Fu)+nH(U, V |A,X,Z)
− (H(Wu)−ǫn)− (H(Fu)−ǫn) + ǫn
− (H(Fv)− ǫn)−H(Wv|A
n, Xn, Zn, Un, Fv)
(d)
≤ −nH(U |Z,A) +nH(U, V |A,X,Z)
+ 4ǫn −H(Fv)−H(V
n|An, Xn, Zn, Un, Fv) + nǫ
′
n
(e)
≤ −nH(U |Z,A) +nH(U, V |A,X,Z)
+ 4ǫn −H(V
n|An, Xn, Zn, Un)+nǫ′n
= −nI(U ;X |Z,A) + 4ǫn + nǫ
′
n (50)
where (a) follows because Un determines (Fu,Wu), A
n
determines (Fa,Wa), and V
n determines (Fv,Wv), (b) follows
by (47) such that Wu and Fu are almost independent given
(An, Xn, Zn), (c) follows by (47) such that Wu and Fu
are almost independent of (An, Xn, Zn) and by (31) such
that Fv is almost independent of (A
n, Xn, Zn, Un) and Un
determines Wu and Fu, (d) follows because V
n determines
Wv and by (49), and (e) follows since V
n determines Fv.
Combining (40) and (50), we obtain for Case 2
I(Xn;W,Zn, F )
(a)
≤ n
(
I(X ;Z|A,U) + I(X ;A, V, Y )− I(X ;Y |A,U)
)
+ n
(
I(V ;Z|A,X,U)−I(V ;Y |A,X,U)
)
− n(I(U ;X |Z,A) +ǫ′′)
= n
(
I(V,X ;Z|A,U) + I(X ;A, V, Y )− I(V,X ;Y |A,U)
)
− n(I(U ;X |Z,A) +ǫ′′) (51)
where (a) follows for some ǫ′′ > 0 such that ǫ′′ → 0 when
n→∞.
Case 3: Suppose we have
Ru + R˜u < H(U |Z,A,X) (52)
Rv + R˜v < H(V |U,Z,A,X). (53)
Then, Wu, Fu, and (Z
n, An, Xn) are almost mutually inde-
pendent, and Wu and Fu are almost uniformly distributed by
[24, Theorem 1]. Similarly, Wv, Fv, and (U,
n Zn, An, Xn)
are almost mutually independent, and Wv and Fv are almost
uniformly distributed by [24, Theorem 1]. We have
−H(Un|Zn, An,Wu, Fu)+H(V
n|W,An, Xn, Zn, F )
(a)
≤ −nH(U |Z,A) +H(Wu, Fu|Z
n, An) + nH(V |A,X,Z)
−H(Wu, Fu|A
n, Xn, Zn)
−H(Wv, Fv|A
n, Xn, Zn,Wu, Fu)
+ nH(U |A,X,Z, V )
(b)
≤ −nH(U |Z,A)+H(Wu) +H(Fu)+nH(U, V |A,X,Z)
− (H(Wu|A
n, Xn, Zn) +H(Fu|A
n, Xn, Zn)− ǫn)
−H(Fv|A
n, Xn, Zn,Wu, Fu)
−H(Wv|A
n, Xn, Zn,Wu, Fu, Fv)
(c)
≤ −nH(U |Z,A)+H(Wu) +H(Fu)+nH(U, V |A,X,Z)
− (H(Wu)−ǫn)− (H(Fu)−ǫn) + ǫn
− (H(Fv)− ǫn)−H(Wv|A
n, Xn, Zn, Un, Fv)
= −nH(U |Z,A) +nH(U, V |A,X,Z)
+ 4ǫn −H(Fv)−H(V
n|An, Xn, Zn, Un, Fv)
+H(V n|An, Xn, Zn, Un)
− I(V n;Wv, Fv|A
n, Xn, Zn, Un)
(d)
≤ −nH(U |Z,A) +nH(U, V |A,X,Z)
+ 4ǫn −H(Fv)−H(V
n|An, Xn, Zn, Un) +H(Fv)
+H(V n|An, Xn, Zn, Un)
−(H(Wv|A
n, Xn, Zn, Un)+H(Fv|A
n, Xn, Zn, Un)−ǫn)
(e)
≤ −nH(U |Z,A) +nH(U, V |A,X,Z)
+ 4ǫn−(nRv − 2ǫn)− (nR˜v − 2ǫn)+ǫn
(f)
≤ −nI(U ;X |Z,A) + 9ǫn
+ n(I(V ;Y |A,U)− I(V ;X,Z|A,U)) (54)
where (a) follows because Un determines (Fu,Wu), A
n
determines (Fa,Wa), and V
n determines (Fv,Wv), (b) follows
by (47) such that Wu and Fu are almost independent given
(An, Xn, Zn), (c) follows by (47) such that Wu and Fu
are almost independent of (An, Xn, Zn) and by (31) such
that Fv is almost independent of (A
n, Xn, Zn, Un) and Un
determines Wu and Fu, (d) follows by (53) and since V
n de-
termines (Wv, Fv), (e) follows because Wv and Fv are almost
independent of (An, Xn, Zn, Un) and are almost uniformly
distributed, and (f) follows by (36) and (37).
Combining (40) and (54), we obtain for Case 3
I(Xn;W,Zn, F )
(a)
≤ n
(
I(X ;Z|A,U) + I(X ;A, V, Y )− I(X ;Y |A,U)
)
+ n
(
I(V ;Z|A,X,U)−I(V ;Y |A,X,U) +ǫ′′)
)
+ n(−I(U ;X |Z,A) + I(V ;Y |A,U)− I(V ;X,Z|A,U))
= n
(
I(V,X ;Z|A,U) + I(X ;A, V, Y )− I(V,X ;Y |A,U)
)
+n(−I(U ;X |Z,A)+I(V ;Y |A,U)−I(V ;X,Z|A,U)+ǫ′′)
(b)
= n(I(V ;Z|A,U) + I(X ;Z|A, V ) + I(X ;A, V, Y ))
+ n(−I(X ;Y |A, V )− I(U ;X |Z,A)− I(V ;Z|A,U))
− nI(V ;X |A,U, Z) + nǫ′′
(c)
= nI(X ;A, V, Z)− nI(V ;X |Z,A) + nǫ′′
= nI(X ;A,Z) + nǫ′′ (55)
where (a) follows for some ǫ′′ > 0 such that ǫ′′ → 0
when n → ∞, (b) follows from the Markov chain U −
V − (A,X, Y, Z), and (c) follows from the Markov chain
U − V − (X,A,Z).
Case 4: Suppose we have
Ru + R˜u ≥ H(U |Z,A,X) (56)
Ru + R˜u < H(U |Z,A) (57)
Rv + R˜v ≥ H(V |U,Z,A,X) (58)
Rv + R˜v < H(V |Z,A,X). (59)
Then,Wu, Fu, and (Z
n, An) are almost mutually independent,
and Wu and Fu are almost uniformly distributed by [24, Theo-
rem 1] and we can recover Un from (Fu,Wu, Z
n, An, Xn) by
using a SW decoder [24, Lemma 1]. Moreover, we can recover
V n from (Fv,Wv, U
n, Zn, An, Xn) by using a SW decoder
[24, Lemma 1], but Fv, Wv, and (Z
n, An, Xn) are almost
independent, and Fv and Wv are almost uniformly distributed
by [24, Theorem 1]. We obtain
−H(Un|Zn, An,Wu, Fu)+H(V
n|W,An, Xn, Zn, F )
(a)
≤ −H(Un|Zn, An) +H(Wu, Fu|Z
n, An)
+H(V n|Wv, U
n, An, Xn, Zn, Fv)
+H(Un|Wu, Fu, A
n, Xn, Zn)
(b)
≤ −H(Un|Zn, An) +H(Wu) +H(Fu) + 2nǫ
′
n
(c)
≤ n(−H(U |Z,A) +H(U |Y,A) + ǫ+ 2ǫ′n) (60)
where (a) follows because Un determines (Fu,Wu) and A
n
determines (Fa,Wa), (b) follows by (56) and (58) for some
ǫ′n > 0 such that ǫ
′
n → 0 when n → ∞, and (c) follows by
(34) and (35).
Combining (40) and (60), we obtain for Case 4
I(Xn;W,Zn, F )
(a)
≤ n
(
I(X ;Z|A,U) + I(X ;A, V, Y )− I(X ;Y |A,U)
)
+ n
(
I(V ;Z|A,X,U)−I(V ;Y |A,X,U)
)
+ n(I(U ;Z|A)− I(U ;Y |A) + ǫ′′)
(b)
= n
(
I(V,X ;Z|A) + I(X ;A, V, Y )− I(V,X ;Y |A)
)
+ nǫ′′ (61)
where (a) is for some ǫ′′ > 0 such that ǫ′′ → 0 when n→∞
and (b) follows from the Markov chain U −V −(A,X,Z, Y ).
Case 5: Suppose we have
Ru + R˜u ≥ H(U |Z,A,X) (62)
Ru + R˜u < H(U |Z,A) (63)
Rv + R˜v < H(V |U,Z,A,X). (64)
Then,Wu, Fu, and (Z
n, An) are almost mutually independent,
and Wu and Fu are almost uniformly distributed by [24, The-
orem 1] and we can recover Un from (Fu,Wu, Z
n, An, Xn)
by using a SW decoder [24, Lemma 1]. Moreover, Wv, Fv,
and (Un, Zn, An, Xn) are almost mutually independent, and
Wv and Fv are almost uniformly distributed [24, Theorem 1].
We have
−H(Un|Zn, An,Wu, Fu)+H(V
n|W,An, Xn, Zn, F )
(a)
≤ −H(Un|Zn, An) +H(Wu, Fu|Z
n, An)
+ nH(V |A,X,Z)−H(Wu, Fu|A
n, Xn, Zn)
−H(Wv, Fv|A
n, Xn, Zn,Wu, Fu) + nH(U |A,X,Z, V )
(b)
≤ −H(Un|Zn, An) +H(Wu) +H(Fu)
+ nH(U, V |A,X,Z)−H(Un|An, Xn, Zn) + nǫ′n
−H(Fv|A
n, Xn, Zn,Wu, Fu)
−H(Wv|A
n, Xn, Zn,Wu, Fu, Fv)
(c)
≤ n(−H(U |Z,A) +H(U |Y,A) + ǫ)
+ nH(V |U,A,X,Z) + nǫ′n − (H(Fv)− ǫn)
−H(V n|An, Xn, Zn, Un, Fv) +H(V
n|An, Xn, Zn, Un)
− I(V n;Wv, Fv|A
n, Xn, Zn, Un)
(d)
≤ n(−H(U |Z,A) +H(U |Y,A) + ǫ)
+ nH(V |U,A,X,Z) + nǫ′n −H(Fv) + ǫn
−H(V n|An, Xn, Zn, Un) +H(Fv)
+H(V n|An, Xn, Zn, Un)
−(H(Wv|A
n, Xn, Zn, Un)+H(Fv|A
n, Xn, Zn, Un)−ǫn)
(e)
≤ n(−H(U |Z,A) +H(U |Y,A) + ǫ)
+ nH(V |U,A,X,Z) + nǫ′n + 2ǫn
− (nRv − 2ǫn)− (nR˜v − 2ǫn)
(f)
= n(I(U ;Z|A)− I(U ;Y |A) + ǫ)+6ǫn
+ n(I(V ;Y |A,U)−I(V ;X,Z|A,U)+ǫ′n+ǫ) (65)
where (a) follows because Un determines (Wu, Fu), (b) fol-
lows by (62) for some ǫ′n → 0 when n→ ∞, (c) follows by
(34), (35), and (31), and becauseWu and Fu are determined by
Un, (d) follows because V n determines (Fv,Wv), andWv and
Fv are almost independent given (A
n, Xn, Zn, Un) by (64),
(e) follows because Wv and Fv are almost independent of
(An, Xn, Zn, Un) and almost uniformly distributed by (64),
and (f) follows by (36) and (37).
Combining (40) and (65), we obtain for Case 5
I(Xn;W,Zn, F )
≤ n
(
I(X ;Z|A,U) + I(X ;A, V, Y )− I(X ;Y |A,U)
)
+ n
(
I(V ;Z|A,X,U)−I(V ;Y |A,X,U)
)
+ n(I(V ;Y |A,U)−I(V ;X,Z|A,U)+ǫ′′)
+ nI(U ;Z|A)− nI(U ;Y |A)
(a)
= n
(
I(X,V ;Z|A,U) + I(X ;A, V, Y )− I(X ;Y |A, V )
)
− nI(V ;Z|A,U)− nI(V ;X |A,U, Z) + nǫ′′
+ nI(U ;Z|A)− nI(U ;Y |A)
(b)
= n
(
I(X ;Z|A, V ) + I(X ;A, V, Y )− I(X ;Y |A, V )
)
− nI(V ;X |A,U, Z) + nǫ′′
+ nI(U ;Z|A)− nI(U ;Y |A)
(c)
= n
(
I(X ;A,U, Z) + I(U ;Z|A)− I(U ;Y |A) + ǫ′′)
(66)
where (a) follows from the Markov chain U −V − (X,Y,A)
and for some ǫ′′ > 0 such that ǫ′′ → 0 when n→∞, and (b)
and (c) follow from the Markov chain U − V − (X,Z,A).
Case 6: Suppose we have
Ru + R˜u ≥ H(U |Z,A,X) (67)
Ru + R˜u < H(U |Z,A) (68)
Rv + R˜v ≥ H(V |Z,A,X). (69)
Then, we can recover Un from (Fu,Wu, Z
n, An, Xn) by using
a SW decoder [24, Lemma 1], but Fu, Wu, and (Z
n, An)
are almost independent, and Fu and Wu are almost uniformly
distributed by [24, Theorem 1]. Moreover, we can recover
V n from (Fv,Wv, Z
n, An, Xn) by using a SW decoder [24,
Lemma 1]. We obtain
−H(Un|Zn, An,Wu, Fu)+H(V
n|W,An, Xn, Zn, F )
(a)
≤ −H(Un|Zn, An) +H(Wu, Fu|Z
n, An)
+H(V n|Wv, A
n, Xn, Zn, Fv)
(b)
≤ −H(Un|Zn, An) +H(Wu) +H(Fu) + nǫ
′
n
(c)
≤ n(−H(U |Z,A) +H(U |Y,A) + ǫ+ ǫ′n) (70)
where (a) follows because Un determines (Fu,Wu), (b) fol-
lows by (69) for some ǫ′n > 0 such that ǫ
′
n → 0 when n→∞,
and (c) follows by (34) and (35).
Combining (40) and (70), we obtain for Case 6
I(Xn;W,Zn, F )
(a)
≤ n
(
I(X ;Z|A,U) + I(X ;A, V, Y )− I(X ;Y |A,U)
)
+ n
(
I(V ;Z|A,X,U)−I(V ;Y |A,X,U)
)
+ n(I(U ;Z|A)− I(U ;Y |A) + ǫ′′)
(b)
= n
(
I(V,X ;Z|A) + I(X ;A, V, Y )− I(V,X ;Y |A)
)
+ nǫ′′ (71)
where (a) follows for some ǫ′′ > 0 such that ǫ′′ → 0 when
n → ∞ and (b) follows from the Markov chain U − V −
(A,X,Z, Y ).
Case 7: Suppose we have
Ru + R˜u ≥ H(U |Z,A) (72)
Rv + R˜v ≥ H(V |U,Z,A,X) (73)
Rv + R˜v < H(V |Z,A,X). (74)
Then, we can recover Un from (Fu,Wu, Z
n, An) by using
a SW decoder [24, Lemma 1]. Moreover, we can recover
V n from (Fv,Wv, U
n, Zn, An, Xn) by using a SW decoder
[24, Lemma 1], but Fv, Wv, and (Z
n, An, Xn) are almost
independent, and Fv and Wv are almost uniformly distributed
by [24, Theorem 1]. We obtain
−H(Un|Zn, An,Wu, Fu)+H(V
n|W,An, Xn, Zn, F )
(a)
≤ H(V n|Wv, U
n, An, Xn, Zn, Fv)
+H(Un|Wu, Fu, A
n, Zn)
(b)
≤ 2nǫ′n (75)
where (a) follows because Un determines (Fu,Wu) and (b)
follows by (72) and (73) for some ǫ′n > 0 such that ǫ
′
n → 0
when n→∞.
Combining (40) and (75), we obtain for Case 7
I(Xn;W,Zn, F )
≤ n
(
I(X ;Z|A,U) + I(X ;A, V, Y )− I(X ;Y |A,U)
)
+ n
(
I(V ;Z|A,X,U)−I(V ;Y |A,X,U)+ǫ′′
)
≤ n
(
I(V,X ;Z|A,U) + I(X ;A, V, Y )
)
− nI(V,X ;Y |A,U) + nǫ′′ (76)
for some ǫ′′ > 0 such that ǫ′′ → 0 when n→∞.
Case 8: Suppose we have
Ru + R˜u ≥ H(U |Z,A) (77)
Rv + R˜v ≥ H(V |Z,A,X). (78)
Then, we can recover Un from (Fu,Wu, Z
n, An) and V n from
(Fv,Wv, Z
n, An, Xn) by using a SW decoder [24, Lemma 1].
We obtain
−H(Un|Zn, An,Wu, Fu)+H(V
n|W,An, Xn, Zn, F )
≤ H(V n|Wv, A
n, Xn, Zn, Fv)
(a)
≤ nǫ′n (79)
where (a) follows by (78) for some ǫ′n > 0 such that ǫ
′
n → 0
when n→∞.
Combining (40) and (79), we obtain for Case 8
I(Xn;W,Zn, F )
≤ n
(
I(X ;Z|A,U) + I(X ;A, V, Y )− I(X ;Y |A,U)
)
+ n
(
I(V ;Z|A,X,U)−I(V ;Y |A,X,U)+ǫ′′
)
≤ n
(
I(V,X ;Z|A,U) + I(X ;A, V, Y )
)
− nI(V,X ;Y |A,U) + nǫ′′ (80)
for some ǫ′′ > 0 such that ǫ′′ → 0 when n→∞.
Case 9: Suppose we have
Ru + R˜u ≥ H(U |Z,A) (81)
Rv + R˜v < H(V |U,Z,A,X). (82)
Then, we can recover Un from (Fu,Wu, Z
n, An) by using
a SW decoder [24, Lemma 1]. Moreover, Fv, Wv, and
(Un, Zn, An, Xn) are almost independent, and Fv andWv are
almost uniformly distributed by [24, Theorem 1]. We obtain
−H(Un|Zn, An,Wu, Fu)+H(V
n|W,An, Xn, Zn, F )
(a)
≤ nH(V |A,X,Z)−H(Wu, Fu|A
n, Xn, Zn)
−H(Wv, Fv|A
n, Xn, Zn,Wu, Fu) + nH(U |A,X,Z, V )
(b)
≤ nH(U, V |A,X,Z)−H(Un|An, Xn, Zn) + nǫ′n
−H(Fv|A
n, Xn, Zn,Wu, Fu)
−H(Wv|A
n, Xn, Zn,Wu, Fu, Fv)
(c)
≤ nH(V |U,A,X,Z) + nǫ′n − (H(Fv)− ǫn)
−H(V n|An, Xn, Zn, Un, Fv) +H(V
n|An, Xn, Zn, Un)
− I(V n;Wv, Fv|A
n, Xn, Zn, Un)
(d)
≤ nH(V |U,A,X,Z) + nǫ′n −H(Fv) + ǫn
−H(V n|An, Xn, Zn, Un) +H(Fv)
+H(V n|An, Xn, Zn, Un)
−(H(Wv|A
n, Xn, Zn, Un)+H(Fv|A
n, Xn, Zn, Un)−ǫn)
(e)
≤ nH(V |U,A,X,Z) + nǫ′n + 2ǫn
− (nRv − 2ǫn)− (nR˜v − 2ǫn)
(f)
= n(I(V ;Y |A,U)−I(V ;X,Z|A,U)+ǫ′n+ǫ)+6ǫn (83)
where (a) follows because Un determines (Wu, Fu), (b) fol-
lows by (81) for some ǫ′n → 0 when n → ∞, (c) follows
by (31) and because Wu and Fu are determined by U
n,
(d) follows because V n determines (Fv,Wv), and Wv and
Fv are almost independent given (A
n, Xn, Zn, Un) by (82),
(e) follows because Wv and Fv are almost independent of
(An, Xn, Zn, Un) and almost uniformly distributed by (82),
and (f) follows by (36) and (37).
Combining (40) and (83), we obtain for Case 9
I(Xn;W,Zn, F )
(a)
≤ n
(
I(X ;Z|A,U) + I(X ;A, V, Y )− I(X ;Y |A,U)
)
+ n
(
I(V ;Z|A,X,U)−I(V ;Y |A,X,U)+ǫ′′
)
+ n(I(V ;Y |A,U)−I(V ;X,Z|A,U))
(b)
= n(I(V ;Z|A,U) + I(X ;Z|A, V ) + I(X ;A, V, Y ))
− nI(V ;Y |A,U)− nI(X ;Y |A, V ) + nI(V ;Y |A,U)
− nI(V ;Z|A,U)− nI(V ;X |A,U, Z) + nǫ′′
(c)
= nI(X ;A,U, Z) + nǫ′′ (84)
where (a) follows for some ǫ′′ > 0 such that ǫ′′ → 0 when
n → ∞ and (b) follows from the Markov chain U − V −
(A,X,Z, Y ).
Combining all cases shows that there exists a binning that
achieves all rate tuples (Rs, Rℓ, Rw, C) in the inner bound
given in Theorem 1 for the key-leakage-storage-cost region
Rgs for the GS model with strong secrecy when n→∞.
B. Proof for the CS Model
We use the achievability proof for the GS model. Suppose
the key S′, generated in the GS model together with the
helper data W ′ = (W ′a ,W
′
u,W
′
v) and public indices F
′ =
(F ′a , F
′
u, F
′
v), have the same cardinality as an embedded secret
key S, i.e., |S ′| = |S|, so that we achieve the same secret-key
rate Rs as in the GS model. The encoder f2(·, ·) has inputs
(X˜n, S) and outputs W = (S′ + S,W ′). The decoder g(·, ·)
has inputs (W,Y n) and output Sˆ = S′ + S − Sˆ′, where all
addition and subtraction operations are modulo-|S|. We use
the decoder of the GS model to obtain Sˆ′.
We have the error probability
Pr[S 6= Sˆ] = Pr[S′ 6= Sˆ′] (85)
which is small due to the achievability proof for the GS model.
Using the one-time padding operation applied above, (38),
and (39), we can achieve a storage rate of
Rw ≥ I(X˜ ;A, V )− I(U ;Y |A)− I(V ;Z|A,U) + 4ǫ (86)
for the CS model.
Similar to the GS model, one can show that the expected
cost constraint is satisfied with high probability by using the
typical average lemma.
We have the secrecy leakage of
I(S;W,Zn, F )
(a)
= I(S;W,Zn|F ′)
= I(S;W ′, Zn|F ′) + I(S;S′ + S,Zn|W ′, F ′)
(b)
= H(S′ + S,Zn|W ′, F ′)−H(S′, Zn|W ′, F ′)
= H(S′ + S|Zn,W ′, F ′) +H(Zn|W ′, F ′)
−H(S′|W ′, F ′)−H(Zn|W ′, F ′, S′)
(c)
≤ nRs −H(S
′|W ′, F ′) + I(S′;W ′, Zn|F ′)
(d)
≤ nRs − (nRs − 2ǫn) + I(S
′;W ′, Zn|F ′)
(e)
≤ 3ǫn (87)
where
(a) follows because F = F ′ and S is independent of F ′;
(b) follows because S is independent of (W ′, F ′, Zn, S′);
(c) follows because |S ′| = |S|;
(d) follows by (28) since (S′, Fv,Wv) are almost mutu-
ally independent, uniformly distributed, and independent of
(Un, An, Zn) so that S′ is almost independent of (F ′,W ′)
and uniformly distributed;
(e) follows because the GS model satisfies the strong secrecy
constraint (2) by (28) for some ǫn > 0 such that ǫn → 0 when
n→∞.
We obtain the privacy-leakage of
I(Xn;W,Zn, F )
(a)
≤ I(Xn;W,Zn|F ′) + 3ǫn
≤ I(Xn;W ′, Zn|F ′) +H(S + S′|Zn,W ′, F ′)
−H(S + S′|Zn, Xn,W ′, F ′, S′) + 3ǫn
(b)
≤ I(Xn;W ′, Zn|F ′) + log(|S|)−H(S) + 3ǫn
(c)
= I(Xn;W ′, Zn|F ′) + 3ǫn (88)
where (a) follows by (41), (b) follows because S is indepen-
dent of (Xn, Zn,W ′, S′, F ′) and |S ′| = |S|, and (c) follows
from the uniformity of S. We therefore have the following
results for nine different cases.
Case 1: Suppose (43) and (44). By combining (46) and (88),
we obtain
I(Xn;W,Zn, F )
≤ n
(
I(V,X ;Z|A) + I(X ;A, V, Y )− I(V,X ;Y |A)
)
+ nǫ(3) (89)
for some ǫ(3) > 0 such that ǫ(3) → 0 when n→∞.
Case 2: Suppose (47)-(49). By combining (51) and (88),
we have
I(Xn;W,Zn, F )
≤ n
(
I(V,X ;Z|A,U) + I(X ;A, V, Y )− I(V,X ;Y |A,U)
)
− nI(U ;X |Z,A)+nǫ(3) (90)
for some ǫ(3) > 0 such that ǫ(3) → 0 when n→∞.
Case 3: Suppose (52) and (53). Combining (55) and (88),
we have
I(Xn;W,Zn, F ) ≤ n(I(X ;A,Z) + ǫ(3)) (91)
for some ǫ(3) > 0 such that ǫ(3) → 0 when n→∞.
Case 4: Suppose (56)-(59). Combining (61) and (88), we
obtain
I(Xn;W,Zn, F )
≤ n
(
I(V,X ;Z|A) + I(X ;A, V, Y )− I(V,X ;Y |A)
)
+ nǫ(3) (92)
for some ǫ(3) > 0 such that ǫ(3) → 0 when n→∞.
Case 5: Suppose (62)-(64). By combining (66) and (88),
we have
I(Xn;W,Zn, F )
≤ n
(
I(X ;A,U, Z) + I(U ;Z|A)− I(U ;Y |A)+ǫ(3)
)
(93)
for some ǫ(3) > 0 such that ǫ(3) → 0 when n→∞.
Case 6: Suppose (67)-(69). By combining (71) and (88),
we obtain
I(Xn;W,Zn, F )
≤ n
(
I(V,X ;Z|A) + I(X ;A, V, Y )− I(V,X ;Y |A)
)
+nǫ(3) (94)
for some ǫ(3) > 0 such that ǫ(3) → 0 when n→∞.
Case 7: Suppose (72)-(74). Combining (76) and (88), we
obtain
I(Xn;W,Zn, F )
≤ n
(
I(V,X ;Z|A,U) + I(X ;A, V, Y )− I(V,X ;Y |A,U)
)
+ nǫ(3) (95)
for some ǫ(3) > 0 such that ǫ(3) → 0 when n→∞.
Case 8: Suppose (77) and (78). Combining (80) and (88),
we obtain
I(Xn;W,Zn, F )
≤ n
(
I(V,X ;Z|A,U) + I(X ;A, V, Y )− I(V,X ;Y |A,U)
)
+ nǫ(3) (96)
for some ǫ(3) > 0 such that ǫ(3) → 0 when n→∞.
Case 9: Suppose (81) and (82). By combining (84) and (88),
we obtain
I(Xn;W,Zn, F ) ≤ nI(X ;A,U, Z) + nǫ(3) (97)
for some ǫ(3) > 0 such that ǫ(3) → 0 when n→∞.
Using the selection lemma, there exists a binning that
achieves all rate tuples (Rs, Rℓ, Rw, C) in the inner bound
given in Theorem 1 for the key-leakage-storage-cost region
Rcs for the CS model with strong secrecy when n→∞.
VII. OUTER BOUNDS FOR CLN CHANNELS
We use the following lemma, which is an extension of [33,
Lemma 1] proved for less-noisy BCs, to bound the privacy-
leakage rate for CLN channels.
Lemma 1. For a CLN channel (X ≥ Z|A, Y ), we have
I(Xi;X
i−1|W,S,An, Y n)
≥ I(Xi;Z
i−1|W,S,An, Y n), (98)
I(Zi;X
i−1|W,S,An, Y n)
≥ I(Zi;Z
i−1|W,S,An, Y n) (99)
for i = 1, 2, . . . , n if (S,W )−(X˜n, Y n, An)−(Xn, Zn) form
a Markov chain.
Proof: Consider for any 1 ≤ j ≤ i−1 and i = 1, 2, . . . , n
I(Zj−1, X i−1j ;Xi|W,S,A
n, Y n)
= I(Zj−1, X i−1j+1;Xi|W,S,A
n, Y n)
+ I(Xj ;Xi|W,S,A
n, Y n, Zj−1, X i−1j+1)
(a)
≥ I(Zj−1, X i−1j+1;Xi|W,S,A
n, Y n)
+ I(Zj ;Xi|W,S,A
n, Y n, Zj−1, X i−1j+1)
= I(Zj , X i−1j+1;Xi|W,S,A
n, Y n) (100)
where X i−1i and Z
0 are considered to be constant and (a)
follows from the inequality
I(Xi;Xj|Yj , Aj ,W, S, Z
j−1, X i−1j+1, Y
n\j , An\j)
(a.1)
≥ I(Xi;Zj|Yj , Aj ,W, S, Z
j−1, X i−1j+1, Y
n\j , An\j) (101)
where Y n\j is the set of random variables
{Y1, Y2, . . . , Yj−1, Yj+1, . . . , Yn} and (a.1) follows for
a CLN channel such that (X ≥ Z|A, Y ) by (12) and since
(W,S,Zj−1, X i−1j+1, Y
n\j , An\j , Xi)−(Aj, X˜j , Yj)−(Xj, Zj)
form a Markov chain. Apply (100) repetitively for
j = 1, 2, . . . , i− 1 such that
I(X i−1;Xi|W,S,A
n, Y n)
≥ I(Z1, X
i−1
2 ;Xi|W,S,A
n, Y n)
≥ I(Z2, X i−13 ;Xi|W,S,A
n, Y n)
≥ . . .
≥ I(Zi−1;Xi|W,S,A
n, Y n) (102)
which is the proof for (98). The proof of (99) follows
by replacing Xi with Zi in (100), (101), and (102) since
(W,S,Zj−1, X i−1j+1, Y
n\j , An\j , Zi)−(Aj , X˜j , Yj)−(Xj, Zj)
also form a Markov chain.
A. Proofs of Outer Bounds
Suppose for some δn > 0 and n ≥ 1, there is a pair of
encoders and decoders such that (1)-(6) are satisfied for all
CLN channels such that (X ≥ Z|A, Y ) and (Z ≥ Y |A,X) by
some key-leakage-storage-cost tuple (Rs, Rℓ, Rw, C). If (X ≥
Z|A, Y ) and (Z ≥ Y |A,X), we also have (X ≥ Y |A,Z).
Using (1) and Fano’s inequality, we obtain
H(S|W,Y n)
(a)
≤ H(S|Sˆ)≤nǫn (103)
where (a) permits randomized decoding, ǫn = δnRs +
Hb(δn)/n, where Hb(δ) = −δ log δ − (1 − δ) log(1 − δ) is
the binary entropy function, and ǫn→0 if δn→0.
Let Ui , (W,A
n\i, Y ni+1, Z
i−1) and Vi ,
(S,W,An\i, Y ni+1, Z
i−1), which satisfy the Markov chain
Ui − Vi − (Ai, X˜i) − (Ai, X˜i, Xi) − (Yi, Zi) for all
i = 1, 2, . . . , n.
Secret-key Rate: We obtain for the GS and CS models
n(Rs − δn)
(a)
≤ H(S)
(b)
≤ H(S|W,Zn) + δn
(c)
= H(S|W,An, Zn) + δn
(d)
≤ H(S|W,An, Zn)−H(S|W,An, Y n) + nǫn + δn
=
n∑
i=1
[
I(S;Yi|W,A
n, Y ni+1)− I(S;Zi|W,A
n, Zi−1)
]
+ nǫn + δn
(e)
=
n∑
i=1
[
I(S;Yi|W,A
n, Y ni+1, Z
i−1)
− I(S;Zi|W,A
n, Y ni+1, Z
i−1)
]
+ nǫn + δn
(f)
=
n∑
i=1
[
I(Vi;Yi|Ai, Ui)−I(Vi;Zi|Ai, Ui)+ǫn
]
+δn (104)
where (a) follows by (3), (b) follows by (2), (c) follows from
the deterministic action encoder, (d) follows by (103), (e)
follows from Csisza´r’s sum identity [34], and (f) follows from
the definitions of Ui and Vi.
Storage Rate: We obtain for the GS model
n(Rw + δn)
(a)
≥ log |W| ≥ H(W )
(b)
= H(An) +H(W |An)
≥ [H(An)−H(An|X˜n, Zn)] + [H(W |An, Y n)
−H(W |An, X˜n, Y n, Zn)]
=H(X˜n, Zn)−H(X˜n, Zn|An)+H(X˜n, Zn|An, Y n)
−H(X˜n, Zn|An, Y n,W )
=H(X˜n)+H(Zn|X˜n)−H(Y n|An)
+H(Y n, Zn|X˜n, An)−H(Zn|X˜n, An)
−H(X˜n, Zn|An, Y n,W, S)
− I(X˜n, Zn;S|An, Y n,W )
≥H(X˜n)−H(Y n|An)+H(Y n, Zn|X˜n, An)
−H(X˜n, Zn|An, Y n,W, S)−H(S|An, Y n,W )
(c)
≥
n∑
i=1
[
H(X˜i)−H(Yi|Ai) +H(Yi, Zi|X˜i, Ai)
−H(X˜i, Zi|A
n, Y n,W, S, X˜ i−1, Zi−1)
]
− nǫn
(d)
≥
n∑
i=1
[
H(X˜i)−H(Yi|Ai) +H(Yi|X˜i, Ai, Zi)
+H(Zi|X˜i, Ai)−H(X˜i, Zi|Ai, Yi, Vi)
]
− nǫn
≥
n∑
i=1
[
I(X˜i;Ai) + I(Vi; X˜i|Ai, Yi)− ǫn
]
(105)
where (a) follows by (5), (b) follows from the deterministic
action encoder, (c) follows by (103), and (d) follows from the
definition of Vi.
We obtain for the CS model
n(Rw + δn)
(a)
≥ log |W| ≥ H(W )
(b)
= H(An) +H(W |An)
(c)
≥ H(An)−H(An|X˜n, Zn) +H(An|X˜n, Zn)
+H(W |An, Y n)−H(W |An, X˜n, Y n, Zn)
+H(W |An, X˜n)
= H(X˜n, Zn)−H(X˜n, Zn|An) +H(An|X˜n, Zn)
+H(X˜n, Zn|An, Y n)−H(X˜n, Zn|An, Y n,W )
+H(W |An, X˜n)
= H(X˜n) +H(Zn|X˜n)−H(Y n|An)
+H(Y n, Zn|X˜n, An)−H(Zn|X˜n, An)
+H(An|X˜n, Zn)−H(X˜n, Zn|An, Y n,W, S)
− I(X˜n, Zn;S|An, Y n,W ) +H(W |An, X˜n)
= H(X˜n) + I(Zn;An|X˜n)−H(Y n|An)
+H(Y n, Zn|X˜n, An) +H(An|X˜n, Zn)
−H(X˜n, Zn|An, Y n,W, S)−H(S|An, Y n,W )
+H(S|An, Y n,W, X˜n, Zn) +H(W |An, X˜n)
(d)
=H(X˜n)+H(W,An, S|X˜n)−H(Y n|An)
+H(Y n, Zn|X˜n, An)−H(X˜n, Zn|An, Y n,W, S)
−H(S|An, Y n,W )
(e)
≥H(X˜n)+H(S)−H(Y n|An)+H(Y n, Zn|X˜n, An)
−H(X˜n, Zn|An, Y n,W, S)−H(S|An, Y n,W )
≥ H(X˜n)−H(Y n|An) +H(Y n, Zn|X˜n, An)
−H(X˜n, Zn|An, Y n,W, S)
+H(S|An, Zn,W )−H(S|An, Y n,W )
(f)
=
n∑
i=1
[
H(X˜i)−H(Yi|Ai) +H(Yi, Zi|X˜i, Ai)
−H(X˜i, Zi|A
n, Y n,W, S, X˜ i−1, Zi−1)
+ I(S;Yi|W,A
n, Y ni+1)− I(S;Zi|W,A
n, Zi−1)
]
(g)
=
n∑
i=1
[
H(X˜i)−H(Yi|Ai) +H(Yi, Zi|X˜i, Ai)
−H(X˜i, Zi|A
n, Y n,W, S, X˜ i−1, Zi−1)
+ I(S;Yi|W,A
n, Y ni+1, Z
i−1)
− I(S;Zi|W,A
n, Y ni+1, Z
i−1)
]
(h)
≥
n∑
i=1
[
H(X˜i)−H(Yi|Ai) +H(Yi|X˜i, Ai, Zi)
+H(Zi|X˜i, Ai)−H(X˜i, Zi|Ai, Yi, Vi)
+ I(Vi;Yi|Ai, Ui)− I(Vi;Zi|Ai, Ui)
]
≥
n∑
i=1
[
I(X˜i;Ai) + I(Vi; X˜i|Yi, Ai) + I(Vi;Yi|Ai, Ui)
− I(Vi;Zi|Ai, Ui)
]
(i)
=
n∑
i=1
[
I(X˜i;Ai, Vi)− I(Ui;Yi|Ai)
− I(Vi;Zi|Ai, Ui)
]
(106)
where (a) follows by (5), (b) follows from the determin-
istic action encoder, (c) follows from the Markov chain
W − (An, X˜n) − (Y n, Zn), (d) follows from the Markov
chain S − (An, X˜n,W )− (Y n, Zn), (e) follows because the
embedded key S is independent of X˜n, (f) follows when
Y nn+1 and Z
0 are considered to be constant, (g) follows from
Csisza´r’s sum identity. We use the definitions of Ui and Vi
in (h), and (i) follows because Ui − Vi − (Ai, X˜i)− (Yi, Zi)
form a Markov chain for all i = 1, 2, . . . , n.
Privacy-leakage Rate: We have for GS and CS models that
n(Rℓ + δn)
(a)
≥ I(Xn;W,A,Zn)
= H(Xn)−H(Xn|W,S,An, Y n)−I(Xn;S|W,An, Y n)
− I(Xn;Y n|W,An) + I(Xn;Zn|W,An)
(b)
≥
n∑
i=1
[
H(Xi)−H(Xi|W,S,A
n, Y n, X i−1)− ǫn
−H(Yi|W,A
n, Y ni+1)+H(Yi|Xi, Ai)
+H(Zi|W,A
n, Zi−1)−H(Zi|Xi, Ai)
]
−I(Y n;W |An, Xn) + I(Zn;W |An, Xn)
(c)
≥
n∑
i=1
[
H(Xi)−H(Xi|W,S,A
n, Y n, Zi−1)
− I(Xi;Yi|Ai) +H(Yi|Ai) + I(Xi;Zi|Ai)
−H(Zi|Ai)−H(Yi|W,A
n, Y ni+1)
+H(Zi|W,A
n, Zi−1)− ǫn
]
− I(Y n;W |An, Xn) + I(Zn;W |An, Xn)
(d)
≥
n∑
i=1
[
H(Xi)−H(Xi|Vi, Ai, Yi)− I(Xi;Yi|Ai)
+ I(W,Y ni+1, A
n\i;Yi|Ai) + I(Xi;Zi|Ai)
− I(W,Zi−1, An\i;Zi|Ai)−ǫn
]
− I(Y n;W |An, Xn) + I(Zn;W |An, Xn)
(e)
=
n∑
i=1
[
I(Xi;Ai, Vi, Yi)−I(Xi;Yi|Ai)+I(Xi;Zi|Ai)−ǫn
+ I(W,Y ni+1, Z
i−1, An\i;Yi|Ai)
− I(W,Zi−1, Y ni+1, A
n\i;Zi|Ai)
]
− I(Y n;W |An, Xn) + I(Zn;W |An, Xn)
(f)
=
n∑
i=1
[
I(Xi;Ai, Vi, Yi)−I(Xi;Yi|Ai)+I(Xi;Zi|Ai)−ǫn
+ I(Ui;Yi|Ai)− I(Ui;Zi|Ai)
]
− I(Y n;W |An, Xn) + I(Zn;W |An, Xn) (107)
where (a) follows by (4) and from the deterministic action
encoder, (b) follows by (103), (c) follows by (98) for CLN
channels (X ≥ Z|A, Y ), (d) follows from the definition of
Vi and the deterministic action encoder, (e) follows from
Csisza´r’s sum identity, and (f) follows from the definition
of Ui.
Consider the extra terms
− I(Y n;W |An, Xn) + I(Zn;W |An, Xn)
= H(W |An, Xn, Y n)−H(W |An, Xn, Zn) (108)
in (107). We cannot apply Csisza´r’s sum identity to the terms
in (108) due to the conditioning on Xn, so one should find
another method to have a single-letter expression for (108).
We use the following lemma to replace the terms in (108)
with single-letter expressions and make further assumptions
to bound the extra term.
Lemma 2. Consider the model given in Fig. 1. There exists
a random variable ĎW such that (ĎWn, An, X˜n, Xn, Y n, Zn)
are i.i.d., ĎW − (A, X˜) − (A, X˜,X)− (Y, Z) form a Markov
chain, and
H(W |An, Xn, Y n)−H(W |An, Xn, Zn)
= n
(
H(ĎW |A,X, Y )−H(ĎW |A,X,Z)
)
(109)
when n→∞.
Proof Sketch: Consider the encoder fs(·) and decoder
gs(·) of a lossless source code such that W = fs(ĎW
n) and
Ď̂W
n
= g(W ), where Ď̂W
n
is an estimate of ĎWn. Suppose the
lossless source code achieves the optimal compression rate of
R = H(ĎW ) = H(W )
n
when n→∞. We thus obtain
H(W |ĎWn) = H(W )− nH(ĎW ) +H(ĎWn|W )
= H(ĎWn|W )
(a)
≤ H(ĎWn|Ď̂W
n
)
(b)
≤ nǫn (110)
where (a) follows from the data processing inequality applied
to the Markov chainĎWn−W−Ď̂W
n
and (b) follows from Fano’s
inequality for some ǫn > 0 such that ǫn → 0 when n → ∞.
Since Ď̂W
n
−W−(An, X˜n)−(An, X˜n, Xn)−(Y n, Zn) form a
Markov chain, the proof of Lemma 2 follows by (110).
Suppose the joint probability distribution P
XX˜AY Z
satisfies
also the condition to be a CLN channel (Z ≥ Y |A,X). For
the random variable ĎW defined in Lemma 2, we then have
H(ĎW |A,X, Y ) ≥ H(ĎW |A,X,Z). (111)
Thus, by combining (107), (108), (109), and (111) for a CLN
channel (Z ≥ Y |A,X), we obtain
n(Rℓ + δn)
≥
n∑
i=1
[
I(Xi;Ai, Vi, Yi)−I(Xi;Yi|Ai)+I(Xi;Zi|Ai)−ǫn
+ I(Ui;Yi|Ai)− I(Ui;Zi|Ai)
]
(112)
when n→∞.
Expected Action Cost: We have
C + δn
(a)
≥ E
[
Γ(n)(An)
]
=
1
n
n∑
i=1
E
[
Γ(Ai)
]
(113)
where (a) follows by (6).
Introduce a uniformly distributed time-sharing random vari-
able Q ∼ Unif[1 : n] independent of other random variables.
Define X = XQ, X˜ = X˜Q, Y = YQ, Z = ZQ, A = AQ,
U = (UQ,Q), and V = (VQ,Q) so that U − V − (A, X˜) −
(A, X˜,X)−(Y, Z) form a Markov chain. The outer bound for
all CLN channels such that (X ≥ Z|A, Y ) and (Z ≥ Y |A,X)
for the GS model follows by using the introduced random
variables in (104), (105), (112), and (113), and letting δn → 0.
Similarly, the outer bound for the same class of channels
for the CS model follows by using the introduced random
variables in (104), (106), (112), and (113), and letting δn → 0.
Cardinality Bounds: We use the support lemma [34, Lemma
15.4]. The bound in (16) can be written as the sum of the
bounds in (13) and (15). Therefore, the same cardinality
bounds can be used for the outer bounds of the GS and CS
models. One can preserve P
AX˜
by using |A||X˜ |−1 real-valued
continuous functions. We have to preserve four more expres-
sions, i.e., H(V |A,U, Z)−H(V |A,U, Y ), H(X |U, V,A, Y ),
H(X˜|U, V,A, Y ), and H(Y |A,U) − H(Z|A,U). Thus, one
can limit the cardinality |U| of U to |U| ≤ |A||X˜ | + 3.
Similarly, in addition to the |A||X˜ | − 1 real-valued contin-
uous functions, one should preserve three more expressions,
i.e., H(X |A, V, Y ), H(X˜|A, V, Y ), and H(Y |A,U, V ) −
H(Z|A,U, V ) for the auxiliary random variable V . Further-
more, to satisfy the Markov condition U − V − (A, X˜) −
(A, X˜,X)− (Y, Z), one can limit the cardinality |V| of V to
|V| ≤ (|A||X˜ |+ 3)(|A||X˜ |+ 2).
VIII. CONCLUSION
We derived inner and outer bounds for the key-leakage-
storage-cost regions for a hidden (noisy) identifier source with
correlated noise components at the encoder and decoder to
generate or embed secrets when a cost-constrained action
sequence controls the decoder measurements. The correlation
between the noise components is provided by a model where
the encoder measurement is an input to the decoder measure-
ment channel, as an extension of a BC model. Side information
at the eavesdropper that is correlated with the encoder and
decoder measurements is also considered since it is a realistic
assumption for biometric identifiers. The achievability proofs
of the inner bounds involve a random encoding step using
the OSRB method that provides strong secrecy. The main
difference between the bounds for the GS and CS models is
the increased storage rate for the CS model as compared to
the GS model. The outer bounds are given for CLN channels,
for which important inequalities are derived. The inner and
outer bound terms match for the secret-key rate, storage rate,
and cost, and are different for the privacy-leakage rate.
We illustrated achievable cost vs. secret-key rate pairs for
a set of storage rates with an example, where source and
channel parameters were motivated by realistic authentication
scenarios that use RO PUFs. We showed that an action
sequence significantly decreases the necessity of reliable mea-
surement channels to achieve the maximum secret-key rate.
This reduction in the required reliability allows to have a larger
hardware area available for public storage, which is illustrated
to further increase the secret-key rate achieved for the same
expected action cost.
In future work, we will study the possibility of introducing
a third auxiliary random variable as it might be possible to find
single-letter expressions for the extra multi-letter terms in the
outer bounds by defining another auxiliary random variable.
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